Hezbollah’s relationship with the LAF

Here you can read my op-ed in Now Lebanon in which I comment on the latest clashes in south Lebanon.

Resolution Green-Lighting Israeli Strikes on Iran Introduced by House Republicans

Jamal Abdi
Policy Director, National Iranian American Council


Republicans in the House of Representatives have introduced a measure that would green-light an Israeli bombing campaign against Iran. The resolution, H.Res. 1553 (in full below), provides explicit support for military strikes against Iran, stating that Congress supports Israel's use of "all means necessary" against Iran "including the use of military force". US military leaders have warned that strikes could be catastrophic to US national security interests and could engulf the Middle East in a "calamitous" regional war.
Nearly a third of House Republicans have signed onto the resolution, which has been publicly discussed and circulated by its lead sponsor, Rep. Louie Gohmert (R-TX), for months. The National Iranian American Council is leading calls to oppose the measure, urging those concerned to demand that House Republican Leader John Boehner denounce the resolution.
The introduction of the measure coincides with a pattern of renewed calls for military strikes that have escalated since President Obama signed "crippling" Congressional Iran sanctions into law. Neoconservatives who were instrumental in orchestrating the Iraq War, such as Bill Kristol, and Reuel Marc Gerecht, have led the stepped up calls for military action.
Hawkish former Bush Administration official John Bolton recently laid out the game plan to prod Israel into attacking Iran, arguing that outsiders can "create broad support" for a strike by framing it as an issue of Israel's right to self defense. Supporters for military strikes, Bolton says, should "defend the specific tactic of pre-emptive attacks" against Iran. He urges that Congress can "make it clear" that it supports such strikes and that "having visible congressional support in place at the outset will reassure the Israeli government, which is legitimately concerned about Mr. Obama's likely negative reaction to such an attack."
In spite of enthusiasm from the neocons, top US military leaders have warned of the many dangers of military strikes against Iran. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has argued, "Another war in the Middle East is the last thing we need. In fact, I believe it would be disastrous on a number of levels." Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has expressed his own serious reservations about an attack, stating, "Iran getting a nuclear weapon would be incredibly destabilizing. Attacking them would also create the same kind of outcome. In an area that's so unstable right now, we just don't need more of that." General David Petraeus has warned that a strike on Iran would be utilized by the Iranian government to unite it's otherwise divided populace.
Simulations have been conducted over the past year to assess the outcome of a preemptive military strike against Iran. One such simulation, by the Brookings Institution's Saban Center, found that strikes would draw the US into the conflict that would engulf the region into war, and would enable Iran to use the attacks as an opportunity to unite the Iranian people and dismantle its opposition. The simulation also found that the strikes could not destroy Iran's nuclear program but merely set it back a few years.
An Oxford Research Group report released recently reinforced those findings and also warned that an Israeli attack would be disastrous and would be unlikely to stop Iran's nuclear program. Instead, the report concluded attacks could convince Iran to withdraw from the international Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and to aggressively seek to develop nuclear weapons.
Iranian activists have urged that even raising the specter of war undercuts the opposition in Iran. "The mere fact that Obama didn't make military threats made the Green Movement possible," noted Akbar Ganji. "A military attack would destroy all of that."

Is Amiri An Old Aid For CIA?

Shehram Amiri, the Iranian scientist who American officials say defected to the United States, only to return to Tehran on Thursday, had been an informant for the Central Intelligence Agency inside Iran for several years, providing information about the country’s nuclear program, according to United States officials, NYTimes reported today.
US officials told the WSJ that Amiri "has given significant, original information that's checked out".
The Washington Post reported yesterday that Amiri received a payment of $5 million that was put into U.S. bank accounts to which he had access from Iran.
A U.S. official familiar with the case of the Iranian nuclear scientist says the United States "clearly got the better end of things."

An Attack on Iran: Back on the Table

An Attack on Iran: Back on the Table

'Iran nearing nuclear bombs' Russia warns

(BBC)

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev says Iran is "moving closer" to having the potential to create nuclear weapons.

It is one of the first times Moscow has publicly recognised that Iran might be moving towards a nuclear weapon.

Russia, which has strong economic and military ties with Iran, has traditionally been an ally of Tehran.

But it has recently adopted a tougher stance towards Tehran's nuclear drive, and backed the fourth round of UN sanctions that was imposed last month.

"Iran is moving closer to possessing the potential which in principle could be used for the creation of nuclear weapons," Mr Medvedev told a meeting of ambassadors in Moscow.

The US and major European Union powers suspect that Iran is trying to build nuclear weapons. Iran says its nuclear programme is peaceful.

On 10 June, the UN Security Council endorsed a fourth round of sanctions on Iran, including tighter financial curbs and an expanded arms embargo.

Since then, the US and EU have unilaterally imposed additional sanctions, including a ban on investment in Iran's oil and gas industry, as well as trade with key banks and individuals.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has dismissed the vote and rejected calls to halt uranium enrichment - which could have military as well as civilian uses.

Hezbollah denies Fadlallah the Status Of Marja

In an op- ed he wrote to Annahar commemorating late Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadllalah, Lebanon's Speaker of The House Nabih Berri refrained from using the word "Marja", Arabic to religious and spiritual reference, while referring to Fadllalah.

However, Berri, known for his polished pragmatic tactics, used the word "marja" in his op-ed, yet in a general manner and not in the main title of the late cleric, hence not alarming Hezbollah. Berri himself had a difficult relation with Fadlallah.

Shiites believers choose a marja, whose teachings they follow and to whom they give alms.

While Ayatollah Fadlallah was a marja to Shiites across the Islamic world, in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, as well as in Arab nations, Hezbollah never acknowledged his status. His relation with Hezbollah has suffered ever since 1989, when Hezbollah chose to subscribe to the successors of the founder of The Islamic Republic of Iran Ayatollah Khomeini.

Like Berri, Almanar TV, Hezbollah's propaganda arm, referred to him only as Ayatollah.

In fact the question of the " marjaiyah", has received more urgency in the event of Fadlallah's death. The late sayed is one of two influential Shiite clerics who oppose the theory of "wilayat Al Faqeeh", Rule of the Jurisprudent, the second being Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq.

For beginners, this theory bestows on one individual the divine role of the Shiite 12 Imam Almahdi, and entitles him to be his deputy. Almahdi is messianic Shiite figure who went into occultation in the 9th century and whom Shiite believe he will re-appear before the Day Of Judgment, to rid the world of wrongdoing, injustice and tyranny.

The position of the Waley Alfaqeeh is now occupied by Ayatollah Ali Khamenie of Iran.

Fadlallah argued for the institutionalization of the "marjaiya" as opposed to individual based rule.

Other Shiite clerics, who would at a certain point qualify as "marja" are politically subordinates to the autocratic regime in Iran.

The War on The Truth

For all of those following the detained Alfa employee story, pay attention to the sensitive and gigantic role attributed to him in March 8 media, where the coverage focuses on one particular aspect: Whatever this employee's role was, it is supposed to have allowed the Israelis to "manipulate cell phone data", meaning it allowed Israeli intelligence agencies to fabricate cell phone activities (calls and SMSs) on certain accounts behind subscribers' backs.

Whether the Alfa employee is an Israeli spy or not, is something to be determined through official investigation, however it is interesting that March 8 media seems to have "privileged" access to the case. Not only that, it is being very smart in preparing pretext to discredit the expected indictment in PM Rafik Hariri case.

It is now a given fact that a given group of cell phone numbers have played an "instrumental role in the planning of the investigation" as per the conclusions of Mr. Detlev Mehlis, the head of the international independent investigation commission in he Hariri case. Mehlis concluded that "the prepaid telephone cards is one of the most important leads in this investigation in terms of who was actually on the ground executing the assassination. This is a line of investigation that needs to be pursued thoroughly." His conclusions have never been refuted by his successors.

In fact Hezbollah picked up from where some of its friendly media has ended.

Hezbollah MP Mohammad Raad accused Israel of seeking to plot and sow discord among the Lebanese by targeting Lebanon's telecommunications network.
In the same sense of exaggeration displayed in the March 8 media coverage of the arrest of the Alfa employee for charges of spying for the Israeli Mossad, Raad concluded, without the slightest hint of doubt, that "the enemy is controlling all communications in this country" and is capable of "sowing strife through such calls."


Hezbollah's ally, Syrian Socialist National Party, urged the Lebanese government to send the Security Council an urgent complaint stating Lebanon's reservation on the adoption of the International Tribunal of sources and evidence pertaining to the instruments of espionage.

Accordingly, any none preferred indictment, which would be based (among other factors) on cell phone data analysis, would be easily trashed as Israeli conspiracy..

It is not a coincidence that Wissam Eid, a key intelligence officer who was killed in a car bomb on January 25, 2008, was deeply involved in technical analysis to break the group of cell phones which are believed to have played a major role in the crime of assassinating Hariri.

The Real Race for Iran: Human Rights v. Tehran’s Defenders

Josh shahrayar of Enduring America penned an interesting response to "Race for Iran" authers' previous reponse to “Misreading Tehran”, a series of seven articles published on the Foreign Policy website.
RFI authers, one a former CIA and National Security Council official, the other a former diplomat in the State Department, have displayed firm support to the Tehran's neo-cons all through the current crisis, unshaken by the all the detentions, abuses, and unlawful killings since June 2009.

Meeting the Challenge: When Time Runs Out

An update to the Bipartisan Policy Center report on U.S. policy toward Iranian nuclear development. The most immediate national security threat to the United States is Iran’s rapid progress toward achieving nuclear weapons capability—and time is running out. A nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran must be prevented, as it cannot be contained. Indeed, it would spark a dramatically destabilizing proliferation cascade in the Middle East—already a combustible region—and lead to a critical conflict.

Read full report here.

Iran: We've enriched uranium to 20% purity - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News

Iran: We've enriched uranium to 20% purity - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News

My Interview With Iraqi Election Winner Iyad Allawi

Nejad's Ayatollah Mentor Preaches For Nuclear Bomb Production

In a thinly veiled statement the hard-line spiritual mentor of Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made a rare public call for producing a nuclear weapon.
Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi wrote the following in his book “The Islamic Revolution — Surges in Political Changes in History’’:

The most advanced weapons must be produced inside our country even if our enemies don’t like it. There is no reason that they have the right to produce a special type of weapons, while other countries are deprived of it.
(...) Under Islamic teachings, all common tools and materialistic instruments must be employed against the enemy and prevent [the] enemy’s military superiority.

Yazdi’s hard-line views, including devotion to the Mahdi, a messiah-like figure to reappear ahead of judgment day, have had a strong impact on President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who shows him more respect than any other senior cleric.

Yazdi's book was written in 2005 and then reprinted last year, but would have only had a very limited circulation among senior clerics and would not have been public knowledge.

Iran Selling 45 Billion Euros of Reserves for Dollars

By Ali Sheikholeslami



June 2 (Bloomberg) -- Iran’s central bank began the first phase of the 45 billion-euro ($55 billion) sale of some of its reserves for dollars, the state-run Jaam-e-Jam newspaper reported, citing people it didn’t identify.

The bank is selling 15 billion euros in the first of three stages, which will be completed by Sept. 22, the newspaper reported on its website on May 31.
Iran will “substantially” decrease its oil sales in euros, the paper said. It informed Japan and other crude-oil customers of the change, Jaam-e-Jam said. The Persian Gulf country’s euro reserves are 55 percent of the total, and would be reduced to 20 to 25 percent after the sale is complete and after oil sales in euros have been reduced, the paper said.
Iran’s shift out of euros has been prompted by the single currency’s decline, said Jaam-e-Jam, which is owned by the state broadcaster. Other central banks, including those of the Persian Gulf states, also are selling their euro reserves, it said.
The euro was little changed against the dollar, rising 0.1 percent to $1.2241 at 12:45 p.m. in New York.
The euro made up 27.4 percent of global currency reserves at the end of 2009, according to the most recent data available from the International Monetary Fund. While that was down from 27.8 percent in September, it was up from 26.4 percent a year earlier.
Experts in Iran’s central bank have suggested the country buy gold because they forecast the precious metal’s price will increase, Jaam-e-Jam said.
Euro’s Decline
The euro has fallen 15 percent against the dollar this year, reaching a four-year low yesterday, amid concern the debt crisis that started in Greece will spread to other nations and dent economic growth. The slide forced European Union leaders to piece together an almost $1 trillion loan package last month as confidence in the euro’s status as an alternative reserve currency to the dollar faded.
Gold is up 11 percent this year and is headed for a 10th annual gain, the longest rally since at least 1920. The metal reached a record $1,249.40 an ounce on May 14 and traded at $1,223.05 an ounce in London today.

Iran Has Fuel for 2 Nuclear Weapons

In their last report before the United Nations Security Council votes on sanctions against Iran, international nuclear inspectors declared Monday that Iran has amassed more than two tons of enriched uranium, an amount sufficient, with further enrichment, to feed two nuclear heads.

The toughly worded report, details aspects of the Iranian nuclear program which would render the LEU swap deal offered by the P5 + 1 some 8 months ago unattractive.

Iran had now enriched 2,427 kilograms to just over three percent level. That means shipping out 2,640 pounds (1,200 kilograms) now, as per the swap deal terms, would still leave Iran with more than enough material to make a nuclear weapon.

The NY Times cites further details from the report:

It also describes, step by step, how inspectors have been denied access to a series of facilities, and how Iran has refused to answer inspectors’ questions on a variety of activities, including what the agency called the “possible existence” of “activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.”
(...) The inspectors reported that Iran had expanded work at its sprawling Natanz site in the desert, where it is raising the level of uranium enrichment up to 20 percent — the level needed for the Tehran Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes for cancer patients. But it is unclear why Iran is making that investment if it plans to obtain the fuel for the reactor from abroad, as it would under its new agreement with Turkey and Brazil.

In addition the inspectors say sensitive equipment that could be used to extract plutonium for an atomic bomb has gone missing from a Tehran laboratory months after the apparatus was disclosed to a United Nations watchdog agency, LA Times reports:

IAEA inspectors were told in January by a scientist or official at Tehran's Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory that Iran was conducting pyro-processing experiments, work potentially consistent with creating warheads that could be used in developing a nuclear weapon.

But during an April 14 inspection of the laboratory, the equipment — used to remove impurities from uranium metal — had been removed, said the agency's report to its board of governors ahead of a meeting next week. Iran had earlier backtracked, insisting to inspectors it was not engaged in pyro-processing work.

Arms control experts say the apparent attempt to experiment with pyro-processing adds to the cloud of suspicion that hangs over Iran's nuclear program.

The Bushification of Obama

Israeli Media highlighted what it called the first public signs of practical preparations for a possible US military operation against Iran.

The conclusion is based on an executive order signed by US Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus and front-paged by NY Times.

The secret Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Execute Order signed on September 30, 2009 set the stage for an increase in covert operations to counter militants and other threats across the Middle East.

Accordingly, Special Operations forces were authorized to deploy to both allied and hostile nations in the Mideast, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa to conduct surveillance missions and partner with local forces.

The seven-page order, interestingly, cites Iran as one of the many theaters these operations are taking place on, in order to "prepare the environment" for future attacks, anonymous sources told the paper.

This directive, must have had the approval of the President. However it was signed amidst a reported confrontation between President Obama on one side and Bob Gates, Mike Mullen, David Petraeus, and Stanley McChrystal on the other, as Jonathan Alter reported for Newsweek Web.

Mullen dug himself in especially deep at his reconfirmation hearings for chairman of the Joint Chiefs when he made an aggressive case for a long-term commitment in Afghanistan. White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel was enraged at Mullen’s public testimony and let the Pentagon know it. When Petraeus gave an interview to Washington Post columnist Michael Gerson on Sept.4 calling for a “fully resourced, comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign,” the chief of staff was even angrier.

General Petraeus, has a track record of relying on special forces whose work was the backbone of the US troop surge success in Iraq in 2007 as well as in eliminating Al-Qaeda top leaders.

He seems to have succeeded in tilting the administration's policies more to the right.

In his speech thanking the right wing AEI think tank in Washington for giving him the Irving Kristol Award, three weeks ago, Petraeus paid special tribute to the role Fred and Kim Kagan had in the Iraq surge.

Indeed, I’m particularly pleased to have this opportunity because it gives me a chance to express my respect for AEI, an organization whose work I know not just by reputation–but also through first-hand experience.

One recent AEI effort, of course, stands out in particular. In the fall of 2006, AEI scholars helped develop the concept for what came to be known as “the surge.” Fred and Kim Kagan and their team, which included retired General Jack Keane, prepared a report that made the case for additional troops in Iraq. As all here know, it became one of those rare think tank products that had a truly strategic impact.

For beginners, Irving Kristol is celebrated as the father of Neoconservatism, hence, it is worth noting how Petraeus ended his AEI speech.

Well, my goal tonight was two-fold: first, to explain the changes we made in our Army in 2006; and, second, to give a speech that I’d like to think Irving Kristol might have enjoyed.

The classified order, represents a significant escalation of the covert military activities ordered by former president George W Bush at the height of the War on Terror, wrote UK's Telegraph:

Gen Petraeus's directive, which would have had the blessings of the White House, suggests Barack Obama has deviated little in the military handling of the war on terror from his predecessor, George W Bush.

Confused on Iran

The Washington Post Editorial

DEFENSE SECRETARY Robert M. Gates was the focus of one of those curious Washington kerfuffles over the weekend in which a senior official makes headlines by saying what everyone knows to be true. According to the New York Times, Mr. Gates dispatched a secret memo to the White House in January pointing out that the Obama administration does not have a well-prepared strategy in place for the likely eventuality that Iran will continue to pursue a nuclear weapon and will not be diverted by negotiations or sanctions. Mr. Gates quickly denied that his memo was intended as a "wake-up call," as one unnamed official quoted by the Times called it. And that's probably true: It is evident to any observer that the administration lacks a clear backup plan.

President Obama's official position is that "all options are on the table," including the use of force. But senior officials regularly talk down the military option in public -- thereby undermining its utility even as an instrument of intimidation. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered more reassurance to Iran on Sunday, saying in a forum at Columbia University that "I worry . . . about striking Iran. I've been very public about that because of the unintended consequences."

Adm. Mullen appeared to equate those consequences with those of Iran obtaining a weapon. "I think Iran having a nuclear weapon would be incredibly destabilizing. I think attacking them would also create the same kind of outcome," he was quoted as saying. Yet Israel and other countries in the region would hardly regard those "outcomes" as similar.

We are not advocating strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. But the public signs of the administration's squishiness about military options are worrisome because of the lack of progress on its two-track strategy of offering negotiations and threatening sanctions. A year-long attempt at engagement failed; now the push for sanctions is proceeding at a snail's pace. Though administration officials say they have made progress in overcoming resistance from Russia and China, it appears a new U.N. sanctions resolution might require months more of dickering. Even then it might only be a shell intended to pave the way for ad hoc actions by the United States and European Union, which would require further diplomacy.

And what would sanctions accomplish? Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told the Financial Times last week that "maybe . . . that would lead to the kind of good-faith negotiations that President Obama called for 15 months ago." Yet the notion that the hard-line Iranian clique now in power would ever negotiate in good faith is far-fetched. More likely -- and desirable -- would be a victory by the opposition Green movement in Iran's ongoing domestic power struggle. But the administration has so far shrunk from supporting sanctions, such as a gasoline embargo. that might heighten popular anger against the regime.

All this probably explains why Mr. Gates, in his own words, "presented a number of questions and proposals intended to contribute to an orderly and timely decision making process."

"There should be no confusion by our allies and adversaries," he added, "that the United States is . . . prepared to act across a broad range of contingencies in support of our interests." If allies and adversaries are presently confused, that would be understandable.

Video: Raw Video: Iraq Blasts Target Foreign Embassies

Baghdad suicide blasts target embassies; 32 dead

Suicide attackers detonated car bombs near three embassies in Baghdad on Sunday, killing at least 32 people and wounding more than 100, authorities said.

The attacks outside the German, Egyptian and Iranian embassies deepened fears that insurgents will seize on the political turmoil after last month's parliamentary elections to sow further instability.

The blasts went off within minutes of each other, said Maj. Gen. Qassim al-Moussawi, a spokesman for the city's operations command center.

It was not immediately clear whether anyone from the embassies was among the dead or wounded.

"These explosions targeted diplomatic missions," al-Moussawi told The Associated Press. "It's a terrorist act. We expect the death toll to rise." He said all three explosions were set off by suicide attackers in explosives-laden cars.

Multiple, coordinated bombings in the capital have become a hallmark of al-Qaida in Iraq.

Police officials said at least 18 people were killed outside the Iranian Embassy, where AP Television News footage showed civilians loading casualties into police vehicles and ambulances. Stunned victims, many in blood-spattered clothes, were fleeing the scene as smoke rose in the background.

One man was cradling a small girl wearing a white dress in his arms.

"They cannot frighten us," another man defiantly yelled as he was being helped along by police, his robe soaked in blood.

The police officials said many of the victims were employees at a nearby state-run bank. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to release details to the media.

At least 14 were killed in the other explosions, police officials said. Al-Moussawi said at least 140 people were wounded in all three attacks. Other police officials put the total number of injuries at 185.

The explosion near the Iranian Embassy demolished cars and overturned a minibus outside the embassy wall.

"The explosion happened at the embassy gate, targeting visitors and Iraqi police," said Iran's ambassador to Iraq, Hasan Kazemi Qomi. "There was some damage to the embassy building but no employees were harmed inside."

Calls to the other embassies rang unanswered.

The force of the blasts shook buildings and rattled windows in the center of the capital.

Al-Moussawi said police arrested a man who was suspected of planning to detonate a car bomb near the former German Embassy, which is now a bank. The man was arrested inside a car loaded with explosives, al-Moussawi said.

Sunday's explosions came two days after an execution-style attack killed at least 24 Sunnis in a village south of Baghdad. The slayings reignited fears of the sectarian fighting in 2006 and 2007.

There have been increasing concerns that insurgents will take advantage of the postelection period to further destabilize the country. The March 7 parliamentary elections failed to give any candidate a decisive win.

Many fear a drawn-out political debate could spill over into violence and complicate American efforts to speed up troop withdrawals in the coming months.

Sunday's explosions, which occurred shortly before 11:30 a.m., came after a number of far smaller blasts overnight and early Sunday. One of those earlier blasts, believed to be caused by a bomb underneath a parked car killed one civilian and injured nine others, according to police.

Associated Press Writers Saad Abdul-Kadir, Hamid Ahmed, Sinan Salaheddin and Elizabeth A. Kennedy contributed to this report.

Gül lets the cat out of the bag on Iran

SEMİH İDİZ
Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review.

President Abdullah Gül may have inadvertently let the cat out of the bag on Iran’s nuclear program. He was quoted recently by Forbes commentator Claudia Rosett uttering remarks that have not been heard before from any Islamic leader.

The fact that the Presidency issued a statement later denying that President Gül had given an interview to anyone from Forbes magazine showed just how riled the president was upon reading Rosett’s piece. It was nevertheless interesting that the Presidency’s statement did not deny the remarks attributed to Gül, but merely said that he had not given an interview to Forbes.

One can assume, as most people are doing, that Gül actually uttered the remarks attributed to him, but failed to tell the group of visiting Americans that included Rosett that he was speaking off the record. From Rosett’s point of view, and indeed the point of view of any journalist, if it is not said that something is off the record, it is on the record.

Therefore, there is no point in criticizing her, unless what she wrote is being denied, and this does not appear to be the case. Carrying the title “Turkey tilts toward Iran,” Rosett’s article reflects clear annoyance at the change in direction in Ankara’s foreign policy, especially on issues of great importance to Washington.

No doubt it was because of this that she characterized the recent talk her group had with Gül at the Presidential Palace in Ankara as “disturbing.” The basic argument in Rosett’s article is that Ankara is not toeing the U.S. line on Iran. It is instead pursuing a “zero problems with neighbors” policy, but has no concrete formula for convincing Tehran by diplomatic means to give up on its nuclear-weapons program.

For us, neither Rosett’s displeasure here nor Gül’s pushing for the diplomatic track, as opposed to sanctions or a military strike against Iran, is surprising. The former is highly predictable and the later contains nothing new. It has become Ankara’s standard position.

What does matter, however, are other remarks attributed to President Gül by Rosett.

According to her, Gül said he has no doubts that Iran wants a nuclear bomb. “This is an Iranian aspiration dating back to the previous regime, [to] the days of the Shah,” Gül is reported as saying. As for the current regime in Iran, the Turkish president apparently believes its final aspiration is also “to have a nuclear weapon in the end.”

This claim, which many Turkish diplomats and military planners also believe to be true, is, of course, in stark contrast with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s approach to the whole issue. Acting as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s advocate, Erdoğan has said in the past that suspicions that Tehran is after a nuclear weapon are just “gossip.”

Erdoğan has also established a link between Iran’s nuclear ambitions and Israel’s nuclear arsenal, suggesting in so many words that instead of putting pressure on Tehran, the West should first force Israel to get rid of its own arsenal. Many in the Islamic world have read Erdoğan’s approach as a suggestion that as long as Israel has these weapons, then Iran can have them too.

But the real “nuclear remark” said to have been uttered by Gül was not the claim that Iran is after nuclear weapons. He apparently also said that if Iran gets the bomb, it will not use it. At first appearance, this may appear a naïve remark, but what the president was quoted as saying after this puts the whole issue in a stone-cold realistic perspective.

The following is straight from Rosett’s piece:

“Gül says Israel need not worry. However irrational Iran’s leaders might become, he is sure they will remain rational enough to refrain from devastating Israel – lest, by doing so, they should harm the Palestinians or the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem (which he says would then create problems for Iran ‘with all the Muslims of the Gulf and the surrounding regions’).”

These words no doubt had a devastating effect on Iranian officials who are closely following Turkey’s position on their country’s nuclear program. Gül’s remarks must have confirmed to them that not everyone in Ankara is as pro-Iranian as Prime Minister Erdoğan on the issue of nuclear weapons.

But much more devastatingly, Gül’s remarks show that Iran is not in a position to use nuclear weapons against Israel unless it wants to run the risk of destroying and contaminating lands and edifices considered sacred by Muslims. Put another way, unless Tehran gains a highly selective “first strike” capability, as well as finely tuned air-interception abilities for counter defense, its nuclear-weapons program is useless against Israel.

That leaves Tehran with the need to establish new targets for its nuclear weapons. No doubt those will be in the West, but how Iranian capabilities will be able to acquire first-strike and counter-defense abilities in that case is again a wide-open question.

In this sense, it is clear that President Gül, in remarks attributed to him but not denied by him, has indeed let the cat out of the bag, putting forward a proposition that all Muslims will have to think about seriously.

But Israel is also put in a spot by virtue of the same token as a result of President Gül’s remarks. If there is little chance that any Islamic country in the region can use nuclear weapons against Israel, for the reasons cited by Gül, then what is the point in Israel’s having a nuclear arsenal, which merely fuels a pointless arms race in the region?

We should therefore be happy that President Gül has let this cat out of the bag, even if he may not be too happy about it himself. The remarks attributed by Rosett to Gül show there is a need for more rational thinking on this score, and less politicking according to one’s own national interests.

Nuclear weapons are no joke and should not be used in this way, unless one is prepared to court disaster.

Iran Nuclear Scientist Defects to U.S. In CIA 'Intelligence Coup'

By MATTHEW COLE
March 31, 2010 —
An award-winning Iranian nuclear scientist, who disappeared last year under mysterious circumstances, has defected to the CIA and been resettled in the United States, according to people briefed on the operation by intelligence officials.
The officials were said to have termed the defection of the scientist, Shahram Amiri, "an intelligence coup" in the continuing CIA operation to spy on and undermine Iran's nuclear program.
A spokesperson for the CIA declined to comment. In its declassified annual report to Congress, the CIA said, "Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons though we do not know whether Tehran eventually will decide to produce nuclear weapons."

Amiri, a nuclear physicist in his early 30s, went missing last June three days after arriving in Saudi Arabia on a pilgrimage, according to the Iranian government. He worked at Tehran's Malek Ashtar University, which is closely connected to Iran's Revolutionary Guard, according to the Associated Press.
"The significance of the coup will depend on how much the scientist knew in the compartmentalized Iranian nuclear program," said former White House counter-terrorism official Richard Clarke, an ABC News consultant. "Just taking one scientist out of the program will not really disrupt it."
Iran's Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, and other Iranian officials last year blamed the U.S. for "kidnapping" Amiri, but his whereabouts had remained a mystery until now.
Shahram Amiri's wife and other family members reportedly protested outside the Saudi embassy in Tehran last fall, claiming that Amiri had been taken against his will. She said she had last spoken to him on June 3, while he was in Saudi Arabia, when he called her from Medina. She told the Iranian news agency ISNA that Amiri reported that he had been questioned by police in Saudi Arabia. She also denied that Amiri worked for the nuclear program.
According to the people briefed on the intelligence operation, Amiri's disappearance was part of a long-planned CIA operation to get him to defect. The CIA reportedly approached the scientist in Iran through an intermediary who made an offer of resettlement on behalf of the United States.
Since the late 1990s, the CIA has attempted to recruit Iranian scientists and officials through contacts made with relatives living in the United States, according to former U.S. intelligence officials. Case officers have been assigned to conduct hundreds of interviews with Iranian-Americans in the Los Angeles area in particular, the former officials said.
Amiri has been extensively debriefed since his defection by the CIA, according to the people briefed on the situation. They say Amiri helped to confirm U.S. intelligence assessments about the Iranian nuclear program.
In September, President Barack Obama announced the U.S., the United Kingdom and France had evidence that Iran "has been building a covert uranium enrichment facility near Qom for several years."
One Iranian web site reported that Amiri had worked at the Qom facility prior to his defection.
The New York Times reported Saturday that international inspectors and Western intelligence agencies suspect "Tehran is preparing to build more sites in defiance of United Nations demands."
Officials at Iran's mission to the United Nations did not immediately return calls seeking comment.
"The Americans are definitely letting the Iranians know that they are active in going after Iran's nuclear program," said Hooman Majd, an Iranian-American journalist.
A colleague of Amiri's at Tehran University called the disappearance "a disturbing sign" and blamed the Saudis for helping the U.S., according government-approved English-language web site Press TV.
"The Saudi regime has effectively discredited itself and will be seen by those who know what has gone on in the region as being confined to American demands and effectively abiding by American wishes," said Mohammad Marandi, a Tehran University professor, according to the Iranian web site.
On Tuesday, President Obama said that he wanted sanctions against Iran "this spring."
"I'm not interested in waiting months for a sanctions regime to be in place," said Obama. "I'm interested in seeing that regime in place in weeks."

UNIFIL Versus Hariri Tribunal

It is the latest formula in town spelled out by Tawheed Movement leader Wiam Wahab.
Recently, Wahab has been consistently citing "leaked information" about the The Special Tribunal for Lebanon which links Hezbollah to the assassination of Lebanon's former PM Rafik Hariri.
“Politicizing the international tribunal demolishes Lebanon and turns UNIFIL into a mailbox”, he said following a meeting with the Spanish Ambassador in Lebanon Juan Carlos Gafo, whose country is a main partner in the UNIFIL in South Lebanon.
“The matter needs to be resolved before it is too late. UN member-states should increase pressure in a bid to forbid the US from using the STL as a tool,” Wahab said.

On Thursday Wahab told al-Jadeed TV station that "according to leaked information, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is accusing slain Hizbullah commander Imad Mughniyeh of involvement in ex-Premier Rafik Hariri's assassination".

Agencies Suspect Iran Is Planning Atomic Sites

By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD

WASHINGTON — Six months after the revelation of a secret nuclear enrichment site in Iran, international inspectors and Western intelligence agencies say they suspect that Tehran is preparing to build more sites in defiance of United Nations demands.

The United Nations inspectors assigned to monitor Iran’s nuclear program are now searching for evidence of two such sites, prompted by recent comments by a top Iranian official that drew little attention in the West, and are looking into a mystery about the whereabouts of recently manufactured uranium enrichment equipment.

In an interview with the Iranian Student News Agency, the official, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, said President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had ordered work to begin soon on two new plants. The plants, he said, “will be built inside mountains,” presumably to protect them from attacks.

“God willing,” Mr. Salehi was quoted as saying, “we may start the construction of two new enrichment sites” in the Iranian new year, which began March 21.

The revelation that inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, now believe that there may be two new sites comes at a crucial moment in the White House’s attempts to impose tough new sanctions against Iran.

When President Obama publicly revealed the evidence of the hidden site at Qum last September, his aides had hoped the announcement would make it easier to win international support for a fourth round of economic sanctions, particularly from a reluctant China and Russia. Since then, however, the White House has been struggling to persuade those countries to go along with the toughest sanctions and the administration is now being forced to scale back its proposed list of sanctions.

The United Nations inspectors operate separately from the diplomats who are developing sanctions. Still, the disclosures may be intended, at least in part, to underscore the belief of Western officials that the Iranian efforts are speeding ahead, and the assertions could aid in efforts to press Iran to open up locations long closed to inspectors.

This article was based on interviews with officials of several governments and international agencies deeply involved in the hunt for additional nuclear sites in Iran, and familiar with the work of the I.A.E.A., the only organization with regular access to Iran’s known nuclear facilities. All the officials insisted on anonymity because the search involves not only satellite surveillance, but also intelligence gleaned from highly classified operations.

American officials say they share the I.A.E.A.’s suspicions and are examining satellite evidence about a number of suspected sites. But they have found no solid clues yet that Iran intends to use them to produce nuclear fuel, and they are less certain about the number of sites Iran may be planning.

In any case, no new processing site would pose an immediate threat or change the American estimates that it will still take Iran one to four years to obtain the capability to build a nuclear weapon. Given the complexity of building and opening new plants, it would probably take several years for the country to enrich uranium at any of the new sites.

One European official noted that “while we have some evidence,” Iran’s heavy restrictions on where inspectors can travel and the existence of numerous tunneling projects were making the detection of any new enrichment plants especially difficult.

Iran boasted several months ago, after the disclosure of the Qum site, that it would build 10 more enrichment plants in coming years. That number was dismissed by American officials and others as a fantasy, far beyond Iran’s abilities, or its budget.

But I.A.E.A. inspectors in Vienna now believe that Mr. Salehi was probably accurate when he referred to two sites.

According to American officials, in recent weeks Israel — which uncovered some of the evidence about Qum — has pressed the case with their American counterparts that evidence points to what one senior administration official called “Qum look-alikes.”

The most compelling circumstantial evidence, people familiar with the inspectors’ view say, is that while Iran appears to be making new equipment to enrich uranium, that equipment is not showing up in the main plant that inspectors visit regularly. Nor is it at the Natanz site in the desert, or the new facility at Qum, which inspectors now visit periodically.

That has heightened suspicions that the equipment, produced in small factories around Iran, is being held in a clandestine storage area for later shipment or installed elsewhere.

The small manufacturing factories, spread around Iran to avoid detection and sabotage, are a particular target of American, Israeli and European intelligence agencies. Several of the plants appear to have been penetrated by intelligence agencies, which are receiving sporadic reports about what Iran is producing and troubles it has encountered in manufacturing centrifuges, the machines that spin at very high speeds to enrich uranium.

Assessments of the potential for hidden enrichment sites beyond Qum, and the continued production of centrifuges, is one of the main subjects of an update to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran. That update is being prepared for distribution to President Obama, his top national security team, and selected members of Congress.

Drafts of the highly classified document are now being circulated inside the intelligence community, officials say, but its broader publication has been delayed, in part because of concerns that the early drafts failed to deal with key decisions that Mr. Obama must soon address, especially if long-delayed sanctions fail to change Iran’s current course.

When the last intelligence estimate was published, in November 2007, officials did not know about the Qum plant. Evidence of the plant was discovered later, and contributed to criticism of the report, which also concluded that Iran had halted work on designing nuclear weapons in 2003.

That conclusion, officials say, is also being rewritten, with the United States now joining European and Israeli assessments that research and development work, if halted seven years ago, has probably resumed. “The new report walks away, carefully, from many of the key conclusions of the previous version,” said one person familiar with its contents.

Besides Qum, it is unclear whether the new conclusion is based on new intelligence breakthroughs, or a revised interpretation of the existing evidence.

Iran revealed the existence of the Qum plant to the I.A.E.A. last September, apparently after learning that its existence was now known to the West. Iran subsequently told inspectors that it began work on the plant in 2007 and planned to complete it by 2011, and that it would be filled with 3,000 centrifuges.

Though Tehran’s leaders insist the plant, like their entire program, is for peaceful purposes, that is considered too few centrifuges for a commercial site but ideal for a clandestine military plant meant to make bomb fuel.

But little progress has been made. In their most recent report, the inspectors said that some construction at the Qum site was continuing, adding, however, that “no centrifuges had been introduced” as of Feb. 16.

But officials note that for all the digging, nuclear fuel production in Iran is behind schedule. While the Qum plant is only partly built, its main enrichment plant, at Natanz, operates at a tiny fraction of its intended capacity.

If Iran is indeed making plans to build new facilities, it would be in violation of its agreement with the I.A.E.A. In reports and interviews, inspectors have said they received no notice of new Iranian preparatory activity.

In 2003, Iran signed an agreement with the agency to turn over design information on new facilities. Iran repudiated the agreement in March 2007.

Iran's Nuclear Program: What Is Known and Unknown

Abstract: The Obama Administration's engagement policy toward Iran has failed to defuse the nuclear standoff. Instead, Iran has continued to conceal and lie about its nuclear weapons program in an attempt to stall until it can present the world with a nuclear fait accompli. A nuclear-armed Iran not only will have a dramatically increased ability to threaten its neighbors and U.S. interests, but will also trigger a destabilizing nuclear arms race in the already volatile Middle East. The Administration's best option is to press both its allies and the U.N. Security Council to impose the strongest possible sanctions on Iran to increase the costs to Iran of continuing its nuclear weapons program.

Iran's hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad celebrated the anniversary of Iran's 1979 revolution on February 11 by proclaiming that Iran is a "nuclear state."[1] Iran's radical Shia Islamist regime clearly sees its nuclear program as a means of bolstering its sagging legitimacy and popularity, while expanding its prestige and global influence. It also sees nuclear weapons as a potent equalizer that could deter external attack and ensure its own survival. Tehran has spurned aggressive diplomatic offers from the Obama Administration to resolve the outstanding nuclear issue, just as it spurned efforts by the Bush Administration and by Britain, France, and Germany. As Ahmadinejad said in 2007, Iran's nuclear program is like a train "with no brakes and no reverse gear."[2] Despite five U.N. Security Council resolutions and three rounds of U.N. sanctions, Iran's nuclear train speeds onward.

Iran has forged ahead on its nuclear program despite growing international pressure to comply with its nuclear safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since the discovery of its secret uranium enrichment facility at Natanz in 2002, Tehran has failed to keep its repeated pledges to cooperate fully with the IAEA to demonstrate that it has not used its civilian nuclear program as a fig leaf to mask a nuclear weapons program. Tehran has refused to fully disclose its nuclear activities and to stop its uranium enrichment efforts, which can produce fuel for nuclear reactors or, with further enrichment, the fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Iran has also pushed ahead on its ballistic missile program and building a nuclear warhead that can be delivered by a missile.

The Obama Administration has sought to engage Iran diplomatically to defuse the nuclear standoff, but with little success. Instead, over the past year, Iran has spurned Western proposals to resolve the nuclear issue, insisted that it will continue to expand its nuclear program, installed hundreds more centrifuges to enrich uranium, been caught secretly constructing another uranium enrichment facility, and pledged to build 10 more.

Moreover, on December 14, 2009, The Times of London reported that Western intelligence agencies had uncovered Iranian documents indicating that Iranian scientists had tested a neutron initiator, the component that triggers a nuclear weapon. A neutron initiator has no peaceful application. This discovery directly contradicts the U.S. intelligence community's position that Iran halted nuclear weapons-related work in 2003.[3] On December 18, Iran announced that it was testing more advanced centrifuges, which could enrich uranium faster.

Since 2002, the IAEA has bent over backwards to give Iran the benefit of the doubt, in large part due to the politicized leadership of IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei, who was an outspoken critic of the Bush Administration and often acted as an apologist for Iran. In November 2009, ElBaradei was replaced by Yukiya Amano of Japan.

Under Director General Amano's leadership, the IAEA appears to be taking a more objective look at the Iranian nuclear program. On February 18, it issued a confidential report that warned for the first time of evidence that Tehran is working on a nuclear warhead for its missiles.[4] This warning contradicts the controversial 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which concluded that Iran had stopped working on a nuclear weapon in 2003.[5]

It is time for the Obama Administration to acknowledge that its engagement policy has failed to budge the dictatorship in Tehran on the nuclear issue or on any other issue. As the history of Iran's nuclear program makes clear, Tehran has resisted multiple opportunities to defuse mounting tensions over its nuclear program.

What Is Known

Tehran claims that Iran's nuclear program is devoted solely to civilian nuclear power and research purposes. This contention is contradicted by many facts and by a series of recent revelations.

Fact #1: Iran has built an extensive and expensive nuclear infrastructure that is much larger than what would be necessary to support a civilian nuclear power program.

Iran's nuclear weapons program, cloaked within its civilian nuclear power program, has made steady advances. Iran operates a large uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, which it illegally sought to conceal until 2003, and it is building up a stockpile of enriched uranium that is of no current use in its civilian nuclear energy program.[6] Iran's only nuclear power plant, which Russian technicians have almost finished testing at Bushehr, does not need domestically produced nuclear fuel because Moscow has agreed to provide all the enriched uranium that Iran needs to operate it for the first 10 years of operation. Moreover, Iran does not have a fuel fabrication plant that can produce reactor fuel for the Bushehr facility.

Iran has pursued virtually every possible technology for producing nuclear fuel and did so covertly and in violation of its treaty obligations to keep the IAEA informed. This includes laser separation, a costly and complex technology to enrich uranium that is ill suited to producing fissile fuel for a reactor. Iran has also conducted plutonium experiments and is building a reactor that appears intended for the large-scale production of plutonium.[7]

The Iranian nuclear program cannot be justified on strictly economic or energy grounds. Iran lacks sufficient uranium reserves to run power reactors for more than 10 years and would eventually be forced to import either uranium yellowcake or finished fuel rods to operate them. Moreover, harnessing Iran's enormous natural gas reserves to generate electricity would be far less expensive, given that Iran is currently flaring and burning off natural gas as a byproduct of oil production.[8]

Iran had produced approximately 1,400 kilograms (kg) of low enriched uranium (LEU) metal at Natanz by January 31, 2010.[9] The LEU is enriched to the level of about 3.5 percent, and Tehran claims that it will be used for fuel rods for civilian nuclear reactors. Approximately 1,900 kilograms of LEU is needed to produce enough highly enriched uranium (20 kilograms) to build a nuclear weapon.[10] At its current rate of production, Iran will have enough LEU by the end of July to produce a nuclear weapon if it were further enriched. Once the decision is made, the uranium processing and weapon manufacturing could take as little as six months.[11] Experts quoted by The New York Times in December 2009 claimed that Iran's centrifuges could probably produce enough LEU for two weapons per year.[12]

Tehran is also building a heavy water reactor at Arak, which it tried to build secretly in violation of its treaty obligations. If this reactor is brought online, the plutonium that it produces can be accessed at any time. Once a state has acquired a functioning heavy water reactor like the one at Arak--or even a light water reactor like the one at Bushehr--and it is reprocessing spent fuel rods to extract the plutonium, it gains access to a much easier and more plentiful source of weapons-grade fissile material than is produced in most uranium enrichment facilities. Plutonium also offers the advantage of having a smaller critical mass (the minimum amount needed to produce a nuclear explosion) than uranium-235. Using plutonium allows construction of smaller and lighter nuclear warheads, which are more easily delivered by missiles.

Tehran claims that it needs the Arak facility to produce isotopes for medical purposes. In late October, IAEA inspectors discovered 600 barrels that Iran said contained heavy water, which is used in heavy water reactors as a neutron moderator and coolant.[13] Producing heavy water is very difficult and a major obstacle to operating a heavy water reactor. The heavy water discovered in October may have been secretly imported and is evidence of yet another failure of Tehran to disclose relevant information to the IAEA.[14] Moreover, the provision of heavy water to Iran would be an alarming case of nuclear proliferation, given its weapons-related applications.

Iran's Revolutionary Guards control key sectors of the nuclear program. Nuclear installations are concealed on military bases, dug into hardened sites built underground, and defended with anti-aircraft missiles. Tehran's continued claims that it is building only a civilian nuclear power program appear increasingly ludicrous in light of these facts and each new revelation.

Fact #2: Iran sought to buy technology from A. Q. Khan's nuclear weapon proliferation network, which also provided assistance to Libya and North Korea.

Concrete evidence has confirmed long-held suspicions that Iran advanced its nuclear weapons program in close cooperation with A. Q. Khan's proliferation network, which dealt in weapons-related nuclear technologies.[15] After initially denying this cooperation, Tehran eventually admitted that it had contacts with the network, but maintains that it broke off contact long ago.

Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, has proudly admitted his role in helping Iran's nuclear program. He admitted in a televised interview in August 2009 that he and other senior Pakistani officials had helped to advance Iran's nuclear weapons program.[16] If Iran's nuclear efforts were exclusively focused on civilian uses, as it maintains, it would have had no reason to collude with A. Q. Khan's nuclear smuggling operation, which specialized in the proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies.

Fact #3: Iran continues to conceal and lie about its nuclear weapons efforts.

Iran has a long record of denial and deceit on the nuclear issue.[17] The Iranian regime ordered covert research and development on nuclear weapons and built secret pilot projects on uranium conversion and uranium enrichment in violation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and it lied about these activities for years. In 2003, after the U.S. military overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime in neighboring Iraq, in part because of Hussein's lack of cooperation with U.N. inspectors, Iran admitted some of these activities and agreed to cooperate more fully with the IAEA investigators. However, Tehran reneged on its promise to cooperate and reverted to a hard-line policy after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005.

Today, Iran continues to stonewall IAEA efforts to investigate its suspect nuclear program. It refuses to answer questions about the mounting evidence of its past nuclear weapons development efforts, contending that documents indicating that it has carried out weapons design and testing work are forgeries. It has illegally neglected its treaty obligations to provide advance notice of new nuclear facilities and allow IAEA inspectors to have regular access to facilities under construction. The IAEA has also discovered that Tehran engaged in clandestine nuclear activities that violated its nuclear safeguards agreement, such as plutonium separation experiments, uranium enrichment and conversion experiments, and importing uranium compounds.[18]

Iran continues to play a cat and mouse game with IAEA inspectors by hiding facilities, equipment, and materials from them and by refusing to give them timely access to other facilities. In September, Tehran was forced to admit the existence of a clandestine uranium enrichment facility near the city of Qom. President Barack Obama announced its discovery shortly after Western intelligence agencies had identified it.

Further stoking suspicions about Iran, The Times reported on December 14, 2009, that Iran was working on a trigger mechanism for a nuclear weapon as recently as 2007,[19] four years after American intelligence agencies assessed that Iran had suspended its weaponization efforts. The documents describe a four-year plan to test a neutron initiator, a sophisticated trigger that is one of the final hurdles for building a nuclear weapon. Significantly, the documents described the same type of neutron initiator that Pakistan received from China in the early 1980s and then passed on to Libya in the early 2000s.[20] The IAEA also found evidence of work with polonium-210 in 2004, which suggests that Iran may have been working on a neutron generator. Iran has not adequately explained the discovery.[21]

Mark Fitzpatrick, a former State Department official who focused on Iranian nuclear issues, reacted to the discovery of the documents by saying: "Is this the smoking gun? That's the question people should be asking. It looks like the smoking gun. This is smoking uranium."[22]

There are also worrisome signs that Iran has made advances in uranium metallurgy, heavy water production, and the high-precision explosives used to detonate a nuclear weapon.[23] Iran already claims to produce four kinds of centrifuges used for enriching uranium. The fact that Iran's centrifuge output remained basically level in 2009 despite a high breakdown rate suggests Iran has improved its centrifuge designs and may be using more advanced designs.

A 2009 trial in Germany revealed that the German intelligence agency (BND) assesses that Iran is still pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The trial was interesting because the accused--Mohsen Vanaki, a German-Iranian arrested in 2007 for brokering the transfer of dual-use nuclear equipment to Iran--attempted to use the 2007 NIE as a defense. A lower German court ruled in Vanaki's favor and against the BND based on the NIE's conclusion that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. However, a higher German court sided with the BND's position that Iran's nuclear weapons program is active and provided a report that noted the similarities between Iran's procurement efforts and those of countries with known nuclear weapons programs, such as North Korea and Libya.[24]

More recently, the IAEA issued a confidential report to its Board of Governors on February 18 stating for the first time that it had received extensive information from a variety of sources that "raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile."[25] The report also noted that Tehran has not cooperated in confirming that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities. Tehran has failed to adequately address IAEA concerns on a wide spectrum of issues including: activities involving high precision detonators; studies on the initiation of high explosives and missile reentry engineering; the "green salt project," which involves the conversion of UO2 to UF4; and various procurement-related activities.[26]

The report also confirmed that Iran has begun to enrich uranium to 19.8 percent using a small number of centrifuges, supposedly for the Tehran Research Reactor, a source of medical isotopes. The IAEA reported that Iran already has moved centrifuges from the Natanz uranium enrichment facility to the new facility at Qom. Centrifuges may also have been moved to other, unknown facilities. This is a major cause for concern because IAEA safeguards apply only to nuclear material, not to equipment such as centrifuges.[27]

Fact #4: Iran rejected a nuclear deal that would have advanced its civilian nuclear efforts, belying its claims that civilian purposes are its only motivation.

Tehran has walked away from an offer brokered by the IAEA to enrich Iranian uranium in facilities outside Iran to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor. On October 1, 2009, Iran reached an "agreement in principle" at the Geneva talks that would have sent roughly 80 percent of Iran's LEU stockpile to Russia for processing and then to France for fabrication into fuel rods. The uranium would then be returned to Iran to power its research reactor, which will run out of fuel at the end of 2010. This deal would have benefited Iran by extending the operational life of its Tehran Research Reactor and aiding hundreds of thousands of medical patients. It would also have temporarily defused the nuclear standoff by reducing Iran's steadily growing LEU stockpile and postponing Iran's ability to build a nuclear weapon.

After reaching the agreement in principle, the Iranian regime backpedaled and made an unacceptable counterproposal in mid-December that would have greatly reduced the amount of uranium that would leave Iran. U.S. officials say that Ahmadinejad initially accepted the deal, but was rebuked by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and pulled back from it.[28] On November 3, Ayatollah Khamenei warned Iranian political leaders to be wary of dealings with the United States, which could not be trusted, and said that negotiating with the United States was "naïve and perverted."[29]

The Iranian regime's initial acceptance and subsequent rejection of the nuclear deal is consistent with its long-established pattern of cheat, retreat, and delay on nuclear issues. When caught cheating on its nuclear safeguards obligations, Tehran has repeatedly promised to cooperate with the IAEA to defuse the situation and to halt the momentum for imposing further sanctions. Then, after the crisis is averted, it reneges on its promises and stonewalls IAEA requests for more information. These delaying tactics consume valuable time, which Iran has used to press ahead with its nuclear weapons research.

What Is Unknown

Many important things about Iran's nuclear program are simply not known because of Iran's systematic efforts to conceal and lie about its activities.

Unknown #1: How close is Iran to attaining a nuclear weapon?

It is not known when Iran will take the final steps to build a nuclear weapon. The uranium enrichment facility at Natanz is producing LEU at a rate that will give Tehran enough LEU by the end of July to build one nuclear device if the LEU is enriched further to weapons-grade levels.[30] Tehran could then finish the enrichment process and amass enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon by the end of the year.[31] Natanz subsequently could produce enough LEU to permit construction of two bombs per year.[32] Iran is also constructing a research reactor at Arak, which could begin producing weapons-grade plutonium as early as 2013.

Vice President Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's nuclear program, said on December 18 that Iran has been testing more advanced centrifuge models that will be installed in early 2011. These new models will be faster and more efficient than the old centrifuges, allowing Iran to accelerate the pace of its nuclear program. Salehi claimed that more than 6,000 centrifuges were enriching uranium, which is 2,000 more than the IAEA's November report indicated.[33]

Some, including the U.S. intelligence community, believe that the Iranian leadership has not yet made the strategic decision to pursue nuclear weapons. This position has always been controversial given Iran's huge economic investment in the nuclear program, longstanding willingness to defy sanctions, and well-established pattern of confrontational behavior. It is now nearly impossible to defend this proposition after press reports of Iranian work on neutron initiators, the revelation of the clandestine Qom enrichment facility, and the IAEA's recent finding that Iran was working on a nuclear warhead for a missile.

Unknown #2: How extensive is Iranian-North Korean nuclear cooperation?

North Korea and Iran share a common hostility to the United States and have a long history of military and economic cooperation. Iran's ballistic missile force, the largest in the Middle East, is largely based on transferred North Korean missiles and weapon designs. North Korea has also sold Iran conventional weapons, including rocket launchers, small arms, and mini-submarines. The two countries are known to have close intelligence ties and to exchange intelligence regularly.[34]

The extent of North Korean cooperation with Iran on nuclear issues remains unknown. However, both are known to have received help from A. Q. Khan's proliferation network.[35] Iran helped to finance North Korea's nuclear program in exchange for nuclear technology and equipment, according to CIA sources cited in a 1993 Economist Foreign Report.[36] Increased visits to Iran by North Korean nuclear specialists in 2003 reportedly led to a North Korea-Iran agreement for North Korea either to initiate or to accelerate work with Iranians to develop nuclear warheads that could be fitted on the North Korean No-Dong missiles, which North Korea and Iran were developing jointly.[37]

North Korea has also threatened to transfer a nuclear weapon. According to Michael Green, former Senior Director for Asia at the National Security Council, the head of the North Korean delegation to the nuclear talks confirmed in March 2003 that North Korea had a "nuclear deterrent" and threatened that North Korea would "expand," "demonstrate," and "transfer" the deterrent if the United States did not end its hostile policy.[38] Senior U.S. officials warned the North Koreans that transfer would cross a red line, but Pyongyang evidently brushed aside the warning and cooperated extensively with Syria in building a nuclear reactor, which could have advanced a nuclear weapons program. Green noted that the al-Kibar reactor site, which Israel bombed on September 6, 2007, provided ample evidence of North Korean collusion on nuclear proliferation: "U.S. intelligence officials later confirmed that the reactor was being built on North Korean specs, with North Korean technicians on-site."[39]

Since Pyongyang risked nuclear cooperation with Syria, similar nuclear cooperation with Iran is easy to envision given their much closer ties. The Syrian nuclear project also may have involved Iran, which could greatly benefit from secret facilities located outside its own territory. Der Spiegel reported that North Korean and Iranian scientists were working together at the Syrian reactor when Israel bombed it. Some of the reactor's plutonium production was reportedly designated for Iran, which perceived the Syrian reactor as a "reserve site" to produce weapons-grade plutonium to supplement Iran's production of highly enriched uranium.[40] In late February, Western officials leaked the fact that before the nuclear reactor was attacked North Korea had delivered 45 tons of unenriched uranium concentrate known as "yellowcake" to Syria and that the North Koreans subsequently moved the material to Iran via Turkey.[41]

Another worrisome link between North Korea and Iran involves illegal arms transfers. In August 2008, the U.S. invoked the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to convince India to prevent the overflight of its country by a North Korean flight from Burma to Iran. Although not a member of the PSI, India complied and blocked the flight.[42] What the cargo plane was carrying is not known, but the PSI applies only to missiles and nuclear weapons (e.g., components, technology, and materials). Any North Korean attempt to transfer such items would violate U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718.

Unknown #3: How much foreign assistance has Iran's nuclear program received?

A critical question is how much foreign help Iran has received, in addition to assistance from North Korea and the A. Q. Khan network. The timeline for Iran's nuclear weapons program could be dramatically shortened if it has received substantial foreign assistance in acquiring nuclear technologies, knowledge, or fissile material. The assistance of former Soviet nuclear scientists has long been a subject of speculation and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu reportedly delivered a list of Russian scientists suspected of helping Iran's nuclear program during a mysterious visit to Moscow to meet with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.[43] The Sueddeutsche Zeitung recently reported that Western intelligence agencies have confirmed that Iran has been assisted by a former Soviet scientist who had worked on advanced nuclear warheads in a Soviet nuclear weapons laboratory.[44] There are also longstanding concerns that Iran could accelerate its nuclear efforts by secretly acquiring weapons-grade fissile material from foreign sources.[45]

Where Are We Now?

Iran has relentlessly made steady progress on its nuclear weapons program and soon could acquire nuclear weapons. It continues to violate its IAEA safeguards agreement, refuses to comply with five U.N. Security Council Resolutions on the nuclear issue, and has repeatedly been caught red-handed building secret nuclear facilities and violating U.N. Security Council resolutions that prohibit supplying arms to Hezbollah, its terrorist client group in Lebanon. Meanwhile, it has periodically tested missiles to trumpet its defiance, while systematically repressing and intimidating its own people after they objected to the fraudulent presidential elections in June.

On November 27, 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution demanding that Iran stop construction of the newly exposed uranium enrichment facility near Qom and referred the issue to the U.N. Security Council. This paves the way for expanded U.N. sanctions. Iran responded not only by refusing to halt enrichment efforts, but also by proclaiming its intention to undertake a massive expansion of its enrichment facilities. President Ahmadinejad unveiled plans to build 10 more enrichment plants at a cabinet meeting on November 29. Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran's parliament who formerly led Iran's nuclear negotiations, warned that Iran may decide to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Iran has consistently concealed and lied about its nuclear program and cannot be trusted to abide by any agreements it signs. British Foreign Secretary David Miliband complained that "Instead of engaging with us, Iran chooses to provoke and dissemble."[46] On December 14, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked:

We have reached out. We have offered the opportunity to engage in meaningful, serious discussions with our Iranian counterparts. We have joined fully in the P-5+1 process. We've been at the table. But I don't think anyone can doubt that our outreach has produced very little in terms of any kind of positive response from the Iranians.[47]

Ahmadinejad's regime has made a mockery of the Obama Administration's engagement policy, which was based on the assumption that Iran's ruthless regime sought better relations with the United States and the West. Yet Iran's rulers fear Washington's friendship more than they fear its enmity. Their power and legitimacy is based on resistance to the United States ("the Great Satan") and enforcing Ayatollah Khamenei's harsh vision of God's will, not carrying out the will of their own people.[48]

The Obama Administration's nuclear engagement strategy was also based on the assumption that Iran's unscrupulous Islamist regime could be trusted to come clean on the nuclear issue. This expectation was shattered on September 25, 2009, when President Obama announced in a joint press conference with British and French leaders that Western intelligence agencies had discovered another secret Iranian nuclear facility hidden inside a mountain near Qom.

"Crippling Sanctions." The Obama Administration needs to make good on its promise to ratchet up international pressure to dissuade Iran from continuing to pursue its goal of acquiring nuclear weapons. If Tehran builds a nuclear weapon, it will not only increase Iran's ability to threaten its neighbors and U.S. interests, but also trigger a destabilizing nuclear arms race in the already volatile Middle East.[49] Since 2006, 15 other Middle Eastern states have announced their intentions to begin or expand civilian nuclear energy programs, possible precursors to nuclear weapons programs.

Yet the Obama Administration has resisted congressional efforts to provide it with more sanctions leverage over Tehran. On December 11, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg wrote a letter to Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, requesting that the committee postpone consideration of sanctions legislation against Iran.[50] Steinberg asked for the delay "so as not to undermine the Administration's diplomacy at this critical juncture."[51]

Despite this request to the Senate, the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act passed the House (H.R. 2194) on December 15, 2009, by an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 412 to 12. On March 11, 2010, the Senate passed the bill by unanimous consent after amending it. This bill would penalize companies that help Iran to import gasoline and other refined petroleum products by denying them access to U.S. markets. The Senate passed its own Iran sanctions legislation (S. 2799) on January 28, which would impose similar penalties on companies that export gasoline and other refined petroleum products to Iran, add sanctions on leading officials of the ruling regime, and tighten export controls. It is difficult to understand why the Administration now opposes the kind of "crippling sanctions" that it promised to impose and that Barack Obama promised as a presidential candidate if Iran continued to drag its feet on the nuclear issue.

The United States cannot afford to rely solely on the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran. Russia and China have repeatedly weakened and delayed any action there. Therefore, Washington should push for the strongest possible sanctions that it can squeeze out of the Security Council, but press its allies and other countries to impose even stronger sanctions outside the U.N. framework, such as freezing foreign investment in Iran, banning gasoline exports to Iran, banning the travel by Iranian officials abroad, and generally raising the price that the regime must pay to continue its nuclear program.

Fixing the NIE. The Obama Administration should also update and correct the flawed 2007 NIE on Iran's nuclear program.[52] In 2009, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair reaffirmed the 2007 NIE's finding that Tehran had shut down its nuclear weapons and covert uranium enrichment activities in the fall of 2003. Since then, more evidence has come to light, indicating that Iran has continued its nuclear weapons efforts or restarted them.[53] The governments of Britain, France, Israel, and Germany have publicly disagreed with the 2007 NIE's assessment.

A new look at the controversial NIE is long overdue. Representative Pete Hoekstra (R-MI), the Ranking Member on the House Intelligence Committee, has called for the establishment of a "red team" of non-government experts to review intelligence on Iran's nuclear program and issue an independent report.[54] Representative Hoekstra is right.

Conclusion

Iran's strategy remains clear: to hide and lie about its nuclear program, feign cooperation with the IAEA to delay any sanctions, depend on its Russian and Chinese friends to block any effective sanctions in the Security Council, and eventually present the world with a nuclear fait accompli.

Regrettably, the Obama Administration remains wedded to its engagement policy, which unrealistically seeks to strike a deal with the implacably hostile regime whose self-defined ideological legitimacy is unceasing antagonism to the United States. Even if a diplomatic agreement could be reached on the nuclear issue, it would be foolhardy to expect Iran's unscrupulous dictatorship to permanently abide by such an agreement. Yet the Administration continues to seek such a deal over the bloodied heads of Iranian opposition forces.

Iran is the world's foremost sponsor of terrorism and cannot be allowed to obtain the ultimate terrorist weapon: an atomic bomb. Yet Ahmadinejad's nuclear train rumbles onward. Unless the Obama Administration alters its Iran strategy and moves rapidly to mobilize support for effective sanctions, there will eventually be a nuclear train wreck.

James Phillips is Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.