P5+1 powers expected at Iran talks

The EU says the P5+1 satets, U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany are expected to meet with Iran's nuclear negotiator on Oct. 1.
Spokeswoman Cristina Gallach says EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana will meet with Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. It's not yet clear where.
The announcement of the upcoming meeting came after the United States and its partner nations accepted a proposal made last week by Iran for broader talks.
The Guardia described the meeting as last-ditch attempt to reach an understanding with Iran over its nuclear programme. It wrote:

The meeting will be the first substantial one between Barack Obama's administration and the Iranian government since Obama offered talks without preconditions on coming to office in January. It is likely to represent a final attempt to salvage gains from the US policy of engagement with Tehran before Washington shifts its focus to new sanctions, most probably targeting Iran's oil and gas industry.

However analysts doubt that the talks will be able to bridge the gap in the row about Tehran's nuclear work. Here is Paul Reynold's take on the upcoming meetings:

There is a risk that these talks with Iran might simply confirm differences over Iran's nuclear programme not narrow them. It is not even clear whether Iran's nuclear programme will even be discussed.
The US had said it would raise the issue in any discussions but Iran has said the question is closed. Iran wants the talks to concentrate on a letter it sent the countries negotiating with it - the US, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany - in which it offered talks on global issues. Obviously these countries have felt they must respond.
This is in line with President Obama's offer of an "extended hand" to Iran. The fear among Western diplomats, though, is that Iran is playing for time and trying to put off the possibility of further economic sanctions. The only potentially hopeful sign is that Iran is sending its chief nuclear negotiator.

Playing for time has alway been an Iranian objective. It is no coincidence that one major issue on which Iran markedly differs from the US is the time table of the negotiations. Time's Tony Koran sums up the conditions of succeful process between the two rivals:

Ultimately the fate of diplomacy rests on three factors:

Iran's willingness to compromise; the West's willingness to compromise; and, perhaps most important, the timeframe allowed for negotiations. President Obama is under considerable pressure to show that engagement with Iran produces results — but there may not be any by this fall, the unofficial deadline set by the Obama Administration. If that prompts Obama to seek further sanctions via the U.N. or impose them unilaterally, however, the resultant divide between the West and Russia and China will work to Iran's advantage. New sanctions would also end immediate prospects for a diplomatic solution, because Iran has long declared that it won't negotiate in response to ultimatums. And a continuing stalemate would leave Obama facing either the possibility of an Israeli air strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, or being forced into escalating U.S. pressure until Tehran cries uncle. Both options could greatly destabilize the Middle East.

What would be an appealing Westearn compromise? "Diplomacy centered primarily on Iran's nuclear program is unlikely to work" observes Rubin Right.

The regime as well as many protesters view pressure to end uranium enrichment -- a process to provide fuel for peaceful nuclear energy that can be subverted to develop a nuclear weapon -- as a challenge to Iran's sovereignty and a denial of its economic development. Under the current circumstances, the regime is more likely to engage in a process -- largely to get the world off its back -- that would not produce enduring substance or real resolution.

And if that diplomatic tactic doesn't work, simply slapping on more international sanctions (given stonewalling by Russia and China on anything tough) also seems unlikely to alone squeeze Iran into cooperation.

Yet a military strike is also likely to backfire, instead rallying Persian nationalism around the regime, just as Saddam Hussein's 1980 invasion mobilized support for the revolution at a time it was running out of steam.

The Obama administration would be well-advised to step back and recalculate what conditions would lead Iran to feel that the benefits of beginning the transition to a normal state outweigh the costs of sticking to the revolutionary zealotry increasingly rejected by its own people.

Here is a TIMELINE on Iran's nuclear programme