Why A Deal With Iran Could Mean Nothing?

Washington Post's Glenn Kessler detailed the birth story of the pending deal between Iran and the P5+1 over its nuclear program.

The general parameter of the deal, which was agreed upon "in priniciple", is Iran's acceptance to further enrich its stockpile of low enriched uranium through a third party.

However, some Iranian official offered confusing statements on the deal in the aftermath of the Geneva talks.

Iran's ambassadot to UK, who participated in the Geneva talks, denied, in an interview with the AP, the fact that such a deal had been discussed. Iran' top nuclear negotiator Said Jalili made a clear distinction between Iran's willingness to buy enriched uranium to the purity level of %19.75 from a third party, and its unwillingness to hand over the one-bomb worth of uranium it already posses.

Nevertheless, even if Iran reached an agreement with the P5+1 to trade its posession of enriched uranium, of %3.5 purity level, for another amout of uranium, yet, of higher enrichment (%19.75), and was able to run its medical nuclear reactor, it is still not clear whether or not Iran could abuse the final aquired product for millitary purposes. It is equally unclear, if Iran would be provided directly with enriched uranium of %19.75 purity level or by fuel rods derived from this relatively high enriched uranium.

It was reported that Russia will process the extra enrichment and France will take over to produce fuel rods which Tehran needs for its waining medical nuclear reactor. This is still to be determined in the coming meeting between representatives from France, Russia, US, IAEI and Iran.

In the meantime, experts suggest that despite the deal, Iran could still have a leeway for weaponizing the nuclear material it is about to get.

John Bolton touched on this point in his WSJ op-ed:

After Geneva, the administration misleadingly stated that once fashioned into fuel rods, the uranium involved could not be enriched further. This is flatly untrue. The 19.75% enriched uranium could be reconverted into uranium hexafluoride gas and quickly enriched to 90%. Iran could also "burn" its uranium fuel (including the Russian LEU available for the Bushehr reactor) and then chemically extract plutonium from the spent fuel to produce nuclear weapons.

Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, provided similar conclusion to the Post:

Iran to extract the more highly enriched uranium for weapons. He noted that Argentina published the process online.

While others counter such assessments, Iran is extravagantly showing off its nuclear capabilities. Consider this soundbite by Iran's atomic energy chief Ali Akbar Salehi:

We can enrich uranium, we can process uranium, we can produce fuel rods, we can mine uranium, we can deal with spent fuel, which proves we have a full fuel cycle